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How humans make decisions in non-cooperative strategic interactions is a challenging question.
For the fundamental model system of Rock-Paper-Scissors (RPS) game, classic game theory of
infinite rationality predicts the Nash equilibrium (NE) state with every player randomizing her
choices to avoid being exploited, while evolutionary game theory of bounded rationality in general
predicts persistent cyclic motions, especially for finite populations. However, as empirical studies
on human subjects have been relatively sparse, it is still a controversial issue as to which theoretical
framework is more appropriate to describe decision making of human subjects. Here we observe
population-level cyclic motions in a laboratory experiment of the discrete-time iterated RPS game
under the traditional random pairwise-matching protocol. The cycling direction and frequency are
not sensitive to the payoff parameter a. This collective behavior contradicts with the NE theory but
it is quantitatively explained by a microscopic model of win-lose-tie conditional response without
any adjustable parameter. Our theoretical calculations reveal that this new strategy may offer
higher payoffs to individual players in comparison with the NE mixed strategy, suggesting that
high social efficiency is achievable through optimized conditional response.
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social efficiency
The Rock-Paper-Scissors (RPS) game is a fundamental
non-cooperative game. It has been widely used to study
competition phenomena in society and biology, such as
species diversity of ecosystems [1–6] and price dispersion
of markets [7, 8]. This game has three candidate actions
R (rock), P (paper) and S (scissors). In the simplest
settings the payoff matrix is characterized by a single
parameter, the payoff a of the winning action (a > 1,
see Fig. 1A) [9]. There are the following non-transitive
dominance relations among the actions: R wins over S,
P wins over R, yet S wins over P (Fig. 1B). Therefore
no action is absolutely better than the others.
The RPS game is also a basic model system for study-
ing decision making of human subjects in competition en-
vironments. Assuming ideal rationality for players who
repeatedly playing the RPS game within a population,
classical game theory predicts that individual players will
completely randomize their action choices so that their
behaviors will be unpredictable and not be exploited by
the other players [10, 11]. This is referred to as the
mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium (NE), in which every
player chooses the three actions with equal probability
1/3 at each game round. When the payoff parameter
a < 2 this NE is evolutionarily unstable with respect to
small perturbations but it becomes evolutionarily stable
at a > 2 [12]. On the other hand, evolutionary game the-
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ory drops the infinite rationality assumption and looks at
the RPS game from the angle of evolution and adaption
[13–16]. Evolutionary models based on various micro-
scopic learning rules (such as the replicator dynamics
[12], the best response dynamics [17, 18] and the logit
dynamics [19, 20]) generally predict cyclic evolution pat-
terns for the action marginal distribution (mixed strat-
egy) of each player, especially for finite populations.
Empirical verification of non-equilibrial persistent cy-
cling in the human-subject RPS game (and other non-
cooperative games) has been rather nontrivial, as the
recorded evolutionary trajectories are usually highly
stochastic and not long enough to draw convincing con-
clusions. Two of the present authors partially overcame
these difficulties by using social state velocity vectors [21]
and forward and backword transition vectors [22] to vi-
sualize violation of detailed balance in game evolution
trajectories. The cycling frequency of directional flows in
the neutral RPS game (a = 2) was later quantitatively
measured in [23] using a coarse-grained counting tech-
nique. Using a cycle rotation index as the order parame-
ter, Cason and co-workers [24] also obtained evidence of
persistent cycling in some evolutionarily stable RPS-like
games, if players were allowed to update actions asyn-
chronously in continuous time and were informed about
the social states of the whole population by some sophis-
ticated ‘heat maps’.
In this work we investigate whether cycling is a general
aspect of the simplest RPS game. We adopt an improved
cycle counting method on the basis of our earlier expe-
riences [23] and study directional flows in evolutionarily
stable (a > 2) and unstable (a < 2) discrete-time RPS
games. We show strong evidence that the RPS game is an
2intrinsic non-equilibrium system, which cannot be fully
described by the NE concept even in the evolutionarily
stable region but rather exhibits persistent population-
level cyclic motions. We then bridge the collective cycling
behavior and the highly stochastic decision-making of
individuals through a simple conditional response (CR)
mechanism. Our empirical data confirm the plausibility
of this microscopic model of bounded rationality. We also
find that if the transition parameters of the CR strategy
are chosen in an optimized way, this strategy will outper-
form the NE mixed strategy in terms of the accumulated
payoffs of individual players, yet the action marginal dis-
tribution of individual players is indistinguishable from
that of the NE mixed strategy. We hope this work will
stimulate further experimental and theoretical studies
on the microscopic mechanisms of decision making and
learning in basic game systems and the associated non-
equilibrium behaviors [25, 26].
Results
Experimental system
We recruited a total number of 360 students from dif-
ferent disciplines of Zhejiang University to form 60 dis-
joint populations of size N = 6. Each population then
carries out one experimental session by playing the RPS
game 300 rounds (taking 90–150 minutes) with a fixed
value of a. In real-world situations, individuals often
have to make decisions based only on partial input in-
formation. We mimic such situations in our laboratory
experiment by adopting the traditional random pairwise-
matching protocol [11]: At each game round (time) t the
players are randomly paired within the population and
compete with their pair opponent once; after that each
player gets feedback information about her own payoff
as well as her and her opponent’s action. As the whole
experimental session finishes, the players are paid in real
cash proportional to their accumulated payoffs (see Ma-
terials and Methods). Our experimental setting differs
from those of two other recent experiments, in which ev-
ery player competes against the whole population [9, 24]
and may change actions in continuous time [24]. We set
a = 1.1, 2, 4, 9 and 100, respectively, in one-fifth of the
populations so as to compare the dynamical behaviors
in the evolutionarily unstable, neutral, stable and deeply
stable regions.
Action marginal distribution of individual players
We observe that the individual players shift their ac-
tions frequently in all the populations except one with
a = 1.1 (this exceptional population is discarded from
further analysis, see Supporting Information). Averaged
among the 354 players of these 59 populations, the prob-
abilities that a player adopts action R, P , S at one
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FIG. 1: The Rock-Paper-Scissors game. (A) Each matrix en-
try specifies the row action’s payoff. (B) Non-transitive dom-
inance relations (R beats S, P beats R, S beats P ) among
the three actions. (C) The social state plane for a popula-
tion of size N = 6. Each filled circle denotes a social state
(nR, nP , nS); the star marks the centroid c0; the arrows indi-
cate three social state transitions at game rounds t = 1, 2, 3.
game round are, respectively, 0.36±0.08, 0.33±0.07 and
0.32± 0.06 (mean ± s.d.). We obtain very similar results
for each set of populations of the same a value (see Ta-
ble S1). These results are consistent with NE and suggest
the NE mixed strategy is a good description of a player’s
marginal distribution of actions. However, a player’s ac-
tions at two consecutive times are not independent but
correlated (Fig. S1). At each time the players are more
likely to repeat their last action than to shift action ei-
ther counter-clockwise (i.e., R → P , P → S, S → R,
see Fig. 1B) or clockwise (R → S, S → P , P → R).
This inertial effect is especially strong at a = 1.1 and it
diminishes as a increases.
Collective behaviors of the whole population
The social state of the population at any time t is
denoted as s(t) ≡ (nR(t), nP (t), nS(t)
)
with nq being
the number of players adopting action q ∈ {R,P, S}.
Since nR + nP + nS ≡ N there are (N + 1)(N + 2)/2
such social states, all lying on a three-dimensional plane
bounded by an equilateral triangle (Fig. 1C). Each popu-
lation leaves a trajectory on this plane as the RPS game
proceeds. To detect rotational flows, we assign for ev-
ery social state transition s(t) → s(t+ 1) a rotation an-
gle θ(t), which measures the angle this transition rotates
with respect to the centroid c0 ≡ (N/3, N/3, N/3) of
the social state plane [23]. Positive and negative θ values
signify counter-clockwise and clockwise rotations, respec-
tively, while θ = 0 means the transition is not a rotation
around c0. For example, we have θ(1) = pi/3, θ(2) = 0,
and θ(3) = −2pi/3 for the exemplar transitions shown in
Fig. 1C.
The net number of cycles around c0 during the time
3interval [t0, t1] is computed by
Ct0,t1 ≡
t1−1∑
t=t0
θ(t)
2pi
. (1)
As shown in Fig. 2 (A-E), C1,t has an increasing trend in
most of the 59 populations, indicating persistent counter-
clockwise cycling. The cycling frequency of each trajec-
tory in [t0, t1] is evaluated by
ft0,t1 ≡
Ct0,t1
t1 − t0 . (2)
The values of f1,300 for all the 59 populations are listed
in Table 1, from which we obtain the mean frequency to
be 0.031± 0.006 (a = 1.1, mean ± SEM), 0.027± 0.008
(a = 2), 0.031 ± 0.008 (a = 4), 0.022 ± 0.008 (a = 9)
and 0.018± 0.007 (a = 100). These mean frequencies are
all positive irrespective to the particular value of a, indi-
cating that behind the seemingly highly irregular social
state evolution process, there is a deterministic pattern
of social state cycling from slightly rich in action R, to
slightly rich in P , then to slightly rich in S, and then back
to slightly rich in R again. Statistical analysis confirms
that f1,300 > 0 is significant for all the five sets of popu-
lations (Wilcoxon signed-rank test, p < 0.05). The corre-
lation between the mean cycling frequency f1,300 and the
payoff parameter a is not statistically significant (Spear-
man’s correlation test: r = −0.82, p = 0.19, for n = 5
mean frequencies; and r = −0.16, p = 0.24, for n = 59
frequencies). We also notice that the mean cycling fre-
quency in the second half of the game (f151,300) is slightly
higher than that in the first half (f1,150) for all the five
sets of populations (Table S2), suggesting that cycling
does not die out with time.
A recent experimental work [27] also observed cycling
behaviors in a RPS-like game with more than three ac-
tions. Evidences of persistent cycling in some complete-
information and continuous-time RPS-like games were
reported in another experimental study [24]. However, no
(or only very weak) evidence of population-level cycling
was detected in [24] if action updating was performed in
discrete time. Here and in Ref. [23] we find that even
discrete-time updating of actions will lead to collective
cyclic motions in the RPS game, and such a population-
level behavior is not affected by the particular value of
a.
Empirical conditional response patterns
Under the assumption of mixed-strategy NE, the so-
cial state transitions should obey the detailed balance
condition. Therefore the observed persistent cycling be-
havior cannot be understood within the NE framework.
Persistent cycling can also not be explained by the inde-
pendent decision model which assumes the action choice
of a player at one time is influenced only by her action
a = 1.1 2 4 9 100
f1,300 f1,300 f1,300 f1,300 f1,300
0.039 0.019 0.033 0.007 0.047
0.023 0.023 0.005 −0.002 0.004
0.005 0.054 0.029 0.053 0.024
0.029 0.034 0.041 0.027 0.051
0.015 −0.010 0.008 0.068 0.027
0.052 0.052 0.042 −0.017 0.031
0.028 0.084 0.069 0.032 0.017
0.034 0.041 −0.022 0.049 −0.017
0.073 −0.013 0.069 0.020 −0.012
0.023 0.017 0.035 −0.022 0.053
0.018 −0.005 0.048 0.018 −0.010
0.028 0.018 0.032 −0.005
µ 0.031 0.027 0.031 0.022 0.018
σ 0.019 0.029 0.026 0.027 0.025
δ 0.006 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.007
µ: the mean cycling frequency, σ: the standard deviation
(s.d.) of cycling frequencies, δ: the standard error (SEM) of
the mean cycling frequency (δ = σ/
√
ns, with sample
number ns = 11 for a = 1.1 and ns = 12 for a = 2, 4, 9 and
100).
at the previous time (see Supporting Information). Us-
ing the empirically determined action shift probabilities
of Fig. S1 as inputs, we find that this independent de-
cision model predicts the cycling frequency to be 0.0050
(for a = 1.1), −0.0005 (a = 2.0), −0.0024 (a = 4.0),
−0.0075 (a = 9.0) and −0.0081 (a = 100.0), which are
all very close to zero and significantly different from the
empirical values.
The action choices of different players must be mutu-
ally influenced. Our empirical data shown in Fig. 2 (F–J)
confirm the existence of such mutual influences. Let us
denote by O the performance (output) of a player at a
given game round, with O ∈ {W (win), T (tie), L (lose)}.
Conditional on the output O, the probability that this
player will decide to shift action clockwise or counter-
clockwise or keep the same action in the next play is
denoted as O−, O+ and O0 (≡ 1 − O− − O+), respec-
tively. Most interestingly, we see from Fig. 2 (F–J) that
if a player wins over her opponent in one play, her proba-
bility (W0) of repeating the same action in the next play
is considerably higher than her probabilities (W− and
W+) of shifting actions. Furthermore, for payoff param-
eter a ≥ 2, if a player loses to her opponent in one play,
she is more likely to shift action clockwise (probability
L−) than either to keep the old action (L0) or to shift
action counter-clockwise (L+).
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FIG. 2: Social cycling explained by conditional response. The payoff parameter is a = 1.1, 2, 4, 9 and 100 from left-most
column to right-most column. (A-E) Accumulated cycle numbers C1,t of 59 populations. (F-J) Empirically determined CR
parameters, with the mean (vertical bin) and the SEM (error bar) of each CR parameter obtained by considering all the
populations of the same a value. (K-O) Comparison between the empirical cycling frequency (vertical axis) of each population
and the theoretical frequency (horizontal axis) obtained by using the empirical CR parameters of this population as inputs.
The conditional response model
Inspired by these empirical observations, we develop
a simplest nontrival model by assuming the following
conditional response strategy: at each game round,
every player review her previous performance O ∈
{W,T, L} and makes an action choice according to
the corresponding three conditional probabilities (O−,
O0, O+). This model is characterized by a set Γ ≡
{W−,W+;T−, T+;L−, L+} of six CR parameters. Notice
this CR model differs qualitatively from the discrete-time
logit dynamics model [19, 20] used in Ref. [23], which as-
sumes each player has global information about the pop-
ulation’s social state.
We can solve this win-lose-tie CR model analytically
and numerically. Let us denote by nrr, npp, nss, nrp, nps
and nsr, respectively, as the number of pairs in which
the competition being R–R, P–P , S–S, R–P , P–S, and
S–R, in one game round t. Given the social state s =
(nR, nP , nS) at time t, the conditional joint probability
distribution of these six integers is expressed as
Ps
[
nrr, npp, nss, nrp, nps, nsr
]
=
nR!nP !nS !δ
nR
2nrr+nsr+nrp
δnP2npp+nrp+npsδ
nS
2nss+nps+nsr
(N − 1)!!2nrrnrr!2nppnpp!2nssnss!nrp!nps!nsr! ,(3)
where (N − 1)!! ≡ 1 × 3 × . . . × (N − 3) × (N − 1) and
δnm is the Kronecker symbol (δ
n
m = 1 if m = n and = 0 if
otherwise). With the help of this expression, we can then
obtain an explicit formula for the social state transition
probability Mcr[s
′|s] from s to any another social state
s′. We then compute numerically the steady-state social
state distribution P ∗cr(s) of this Markov matrix [28] and
other average quantities of interest. For example, the
mean steady-state cycling frequency fcr of this model is
computed by
fcr =
∑
s
P ∗cr(s)
∑
s
′
Mcr[s
′|s]θs→s′ , (4)
where θs→s′ is the rotation angle associated with the so-
cial state transition s→ s′, see Eq. [7].
Using the empirically determined response parameters
as inputs, the CR model predicts the mean cycling fre-
quencies for the five sets of populations to be fcr = 0.035
(a = 1.1), 0.026 (a = 2), 0.030 (a = 4), 0.018 (a = 9) and
0.017 (a = 100), agreeing well with the empirical mea-
surements. Such good agreements between model and
experiment are achieved also for the 59 individual popu-
lations (Fig. 2 K–O).
Because of the rotational symmetry of the conditional
response parameters, the CR model predicts that each
5player’s action marginal distribution is uniform (see Sup-
porting Information), identical to the NE mixed strategy.
On the other hand, according to this model, the expected
payoff gcr per game round of each player is
gcr = g0 + (a− 2)× (1/6− τcr/2) , (5)
where g0 ≡ (1 + a)/3 is the expected payoff of the NE
mixed strategy, and τcr is the average fraction of ties
among the N/2 pairs at each game round, with the ex-
pression
τcr =
∑
s
P ∗cr(s)
∑
nrr ,...,nrs
(nrr + npp + nss)Ps(nrr, . . . , nsr)
N/2
.
(6)
The value of gcr depends on the CR parameters. By
uniformly sampling 2.4 × 109 instances of Γ from the
three-dimensional probability simplex, we find that for
a > 2, gcr has high chance of being lower than g0 (Fig. 3),
with the mean value of (gcr − g0) being −0.0085(a− 2).
(Qualitatively the same conclusion is obtained for larger
N values, e.g., see Fig. S2 for N = 12.) This is consistent
with the mixed-strategy NE being evolutionarily stable
[12]. On the other hand, the five gcr values determined
by the empirical CR parameters and the corresponding
five mean payoffs of the empirical data sets all weakly
exceed g0, indicating that individual players are adjust-
ing their responses to achieve higher accumulated payoffs
(see Supporting Information). The positive gap between
gcr and g0 may further enlarge if the individual players
were given more learning time to optimize their response
parameters (e.g., through increasing the repeats of the
game).
As shown in Fig. 3 and Fig. S2, the CR parameters
have to be highly optimized to achieve a large value
of gcr. For population size N = 6 we give three ex-
amples of the sampled best CR strategies for a > 2:
Γ1 = {0.002, 0.000; 0.067, 0.110; 0.003, 0.003}, with cy-
cling frequency fcr = 0.003 and gcr = g0 + 0.035(a −
2); Γ2 = {0.995, 0.001; 0.800, 0.058; 0.988, 0.012}, with
fcr = −0.190 and gcr = g0 + 0.034(a − 2); Γ3 =
{0.001, 0.004; 0.063, 0.791; 0.989, 0.001}, with fcr = 0.189
and gcr = g0+0.033(a− 2). For large a these CR strate-
gies outperform the NE mixed strategy in payoff by about
10%. Set Γ1 indicates that population-level cycling is not
a necessary condition for achieving high payoff values.
On the other hand, set Γ3 implies W0 ≈ 1, L0 ≈ 0, there-
fore this CR strategy can be regarded as an extension
of the win-stay lose-shift (also called Pavlov) strategy,
which has been shown by computer simulations to facili-
tate cooperation in the prisoner’s dilemma game [29–32].
Discussion
In game-theory literature it is common to equate in-
dividual players’ action marginal distributions with their
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FIG. 3: Probability distribution of payoff difference gcr − g0
at population size N = 6. We assume a > 2 and set the unit
of the horizontal axis to be (a− 2). The solid line is obtained
by sampling 2.4 × 109 CR strategies uniformly at random;
the filled circle denotes the maximal value of gcr among these
samples.
actual strategies[11, 16]. In reality, however, decision-
making and learning are very complicated neural pro-
cesses [33–36]. The action marginal distributions are only
a consequence of such complex dynamical processes, their
coarse-grained nature makes them unsuitable to describe
dynamical properties. Our work on the finite-population
RPS game clearly demonstrates this point. This game
exhibits collective cyclic motions which cannot be under-
stood by the NE concept but are successfully explained
by the empirical data-inspired CR mechanism. As far
as the action marginal distributions of individual play-
ers are concerned, the CR strategy is indistinguishable
from the NE mixed strategy, yet it is capable of bring-
ing higher payoffs to the players if its parameters are
optimized. This simple conditional response strategy,
with the win-stay lose-shift strategy being a special case,
appears to be psychologically plausible for human sub-
jects with bounded rationality [37, 38]. For more compli-
cated game payoff matrices, we can generalize the condi-
tional response model accordingly by introducing a larger
set of CR parameters. It should be very interesting to
re-analyze many existing laboratory experimental data
[9, 24, 27, 39–42] using this extended model.
The CR model as a simple model of decision-making
under uncertainty deserves to be fully explored. We find
the cycling frequency is not sensitive to population size
N at given CR parameters (see Fig. S3); and the cy-
cling frequency is nonzero even for symmetric CR pa-
rameters (i.e., W+/W− = T+/T− = L+/L− = 1), as
long as W0 6= L0 (see Fig. S4). The optimization issue
of CR parameters is left out in this work. We will in-
vestigate whether an optimal CR strategy is achievable
through simple stochastic learning rules [34, 35]. The ef-
fects of memory length [43] and population size to the
6optimal CR strategies also need to be thoroughly stud-
ied. On the more biological side, whether CR is a basic
decision-making mechanism of the human brain or just a
consequence of more fundamental neural mechanisms is
a challenging question for future studies.
Materials and Methods
Experiment. The experiment was performed at Zhe-
jiang University in the period of December 2010 to March
2014. A total number of 360 students of Zhejiang Uni-
versity volunteered to serve as the human subjects of this
experiment. Informed consent was obtained from all the
participants. These human subjects were distributed to
60 populations of equal size N = 6. The subjects of each
population played within themselves the RPS game for
300 rounds under the random pairwise-matching protocol
(see Supporting Information for additional details), with
the payoff parameter a fixed to one of five different values.
After the RPS game each human subject was rewarded
by cash (RMB) privately. Suppose the accumulated pay-
off of a human subject is x in the game, then the reward
y in RMB is y = r × x + 5, where the exchange rate r
depends on a. According to the Nash equilibrium theory,
the expected payoff of each player in one game round is
(1 + a)/3. Therefore we set r = 0.45/(1+ a), so that the
expected reward in RMB to each human subject will be
the same (= 50 RMB) for all the 60 populations. The
numerical value of r and the reward formula were both
informed to the human subjects before the RPS game.
Rotation angle computation. Consider a transi-
tion from one social state s = (nR, nP , nS) at game round
t to another social state s˜ = (n˜R, n˜P , n˜S) at game round
(t + 1), if at least one of the two social states coincides
with the centroid c0 of the social state plane, or the three
points s, s˜ and c0 lie on a straight line, then the transi-
tion s → s˜ is not regarded as a rotation around c0, and
the rotation angle θ = 0. In all the other cases, the tran-
sition s→ s˜ is regarded as a rotation around c0, and the
rotation angle is computed through
θ = sgn
s→s˜ ×
acos
( 3(nRn˜R + nP n˜P + nSn˜S)−N2√
[3(n2R + n
2
P + n
2
S)−N2][3(n˜2R + n˜2P + n˜2S)−N2]
)
,
(7)
where acos(x) ∈ [0, pi) is the inverse cosine function, and
sgn
s→s˜ = 1 if [3(nRn˜P−nP n˜R)+N(nP−nR+n˜R−n˜P )] >
0 (counter-clockwise rotation around c0) and sgns→s˜ =
−1 if otherwise (clockwise rotation around c0).
Statistical Analysis. Statistical analyses, including
Wilcoxon signed-rank test and Spearman’s rank corre-
lation test, were performed by using stata 12.0 (Stata,
College Station, TX).
Acknowledgments
ZW and BX were supported by the Fundamental Re-
search Funds for the Central Universities (SSEYI2014Z),
the State Key Laboratory for Theoretical Physics
(Y3KF261CJ1), and the Philosophy and Social Sciences
Planning Project of Zhejiang Province (13NDJC095YB);
HJZ was supported by the National Basic Research Pro-
gram of China (2013CB932804),the Knowledge Innova-
tion Program of Chinese Academy of Sciences (KJCX2-
EW-J02), and the National Science Foundation of China
(11121403, 11225526). We thank Erik Aurell and Angelo
Valleriani for helpful comments on the manuscript.
[1] Sinervo B, Lively C (1996) The rock-paper-scissors game
and the evolution of alternative male strategies. Nature
380:240–243.
[2] Kerr B, Riley MA, Feldman MW, Bohannan BJM (2002)
Local dispersal promotes biodiversity in a real-life game
of rock-paper-scissors. Nature 418:171–174.
[3] Semmann D, Krambeck HJ, Milinski M (2003) Volun-
teering leads to rock-paper-scissors dynamics in a public
goods game. Nature 425:390–393.
[4] Lee D, McGreevy BP, Barraclough DJ (2005) Learning
and decision making in monkeys during a rock-paper-
scissors game. Cognitive Brain Research 25:416–430.
[5] Reichenbach T, Mobilia M, Frey E (2007) Mobility pro-
motes and jeopardizes biodiversity in rock-paper-scissors
games. Nature 448:1046–1049.
[6] Allesina S, Levine JM (2011) A competitive network the-
ory of species diversity. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA
108:5638–5642.
[7] Maskin E, Tirole J (1988) A theory of dynamic oligopoly,
ii: Price competition, kinked demand curves, and edge-
worth cycles. Econometrica 56:571–599.
[8] Cason TN, Friedman D (2003) Buyer search and price
dispersion: a laboratory study. J. Econ. Theory 112:232–
260.
[9] Hoffman M, Suetens S, Nowak MA, Gneezy U (2012) An
experimental test of Nash equilibrium versus evolution-
ary stability. Proc. Fourth World Congress of the Game
Theory Society (Istanbul, Turkey), session 145, paper 1.
[10] Nash JF (1950) Equilibrium points in n-person games.
Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA 36:48–49.
[11] Osborne MJ, Rubinstein A (1994) A Course in Game
Theory. (MIT Press, New York).
[12] Taylor PD, Jonker LB (1978) Evolutionarily stable
strategies and game dynamics. Mathematical Biosciences
40:145–156.
[13] Maynard Smith J, Price GR (1973) The logic of animal
conflict. Nature 246:15–18.
[14] Maynard Smith J (1982) Evolution and the Theory of
Games. (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge).
[15] Nowak MA, Sigmund K (2004) Evolutionary dynamics
of biological games. Science 303:793–799.
[16] Sandholm WM (2010) Population Games and Evolution-
7ary Dynamics. (MIT Press, New York).
[17] Matsui A (1992) Best response dynamics and socially
stable strategies. J. Econ. Theory 57:343–362.
[18] Hopkins E (1999) A note on best response dynamics.
Games Econ. Behavior 29:138–150.
[19] Blume LE (1993) The statistical mechanics of strategic
interation. Games Econ. Behavior 5:387–424.
[20] Hommes CH, Ochea MI (2012) Multiple equilibria and
limit cycles in evolutionary games with logit dynamics.
Games and Economic Behavior 74:434–441.
[21] Xu B, Wang Z (2011) Evolutionary dynamical patterns
of ‘coyness and philandering’: Evidence from experimen-
tal economics. Proc. eighth International Conference on
Complex Systems (Boston, MA, USA), pp. 1313–1326.
[22] Xu B, Wang Z (2012) Test maxent in social strategy tran-
sitions with experimental two-person constant sum 2× 2
games. Results in Phys. 2:127–134.
[23] Xu B, Zhou HJ, Wang Z (2013) Cycle frequency in stan-
dard rock-paper-scissors games: Evidence from experi-
mental economics. Physica A 392:4997–5005.
[24] Cason TN, Friedman D, Hopkins E (2014) Cycles and
instability in a rock-paper-scissors population game: A
continuous time experiment. Review of Economic Studies
81:112–136.
[25] Castellano C, Fortunato S, Loreto V (2009) Statistical
physics of social dynamics. Rev. Mod. Phys. 81:591–646.
[26] Huang JP (2013) Econophysics. (Higher Education Press,
Beijing).
[27] Frey S, Goldstone RL (2013) Cyclic game dynamics
driven by iterated reasoning. PLoS ONE 8:e56416.
[28] Kemeny JG, Snell JL (1983) Finite Markov Chains; with
a New Appendix ”Generalization of a Fundamental Ma-
trix”. (Springer-Verlag, New York).
[29] Kraines D, Kraines V (1993) Learning to cooperate with
pavlov: an adaptive strategy for the iterated prisoner’s
dilemma with noise. Theory and Decision 35:107–150.
[30] Nowak M, Sigmund K (1993) A strategy of win-stay,
lose-shift that outperforms tit-for-tat in the prisoner’s
dilemma game. Nature 364:56–58.
[31] Wedekind C, Milinski M (1996) Human cooperation in
the simultaneous and the alternating prisoner’s dilemma:
Pavlov versus generous tit-for-tat. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci.
USA 93:2686–2689.
[32] Posch M (1999) Win-stay, lose-shift strategies for re-
peated games–memory length, aspiration levels and
noise. J. Theor. Biol. 198:183–195.
[33] Glimcher PW, Camerer CF, Fehr E, Poldrack RA, eds.
(2009) Neuroeconomics: Decision Making and the Brain
(Academic Press, London).
[34] Bo¨rgers T, Sarin R (1997) Learning through reinforce-
ment and replicator dynamics. J. Econ. Theory 77:1–14.
[35] Posch M (1997) Cycling in a stochastic learning algo-
rithm for normal form games. J. Evol. Econ. 7:193–207.
[36] Galla T (2009) Intrinsic noise in game dynamical learn-
ing. Phys. Rev. Lett. 103:198702.
[37] Camerer C (1999) Behavioral economics: Reunifying psy-
chology and economics. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA
96:10575–10577.
[38] Camerer C (2003) Behavioral game theory: Experiments
in strategic interaction. (Princeton University Press,
Princeton, NJ).
[39] Berninghaus SK, Ehrhart KM, Keser C (1999)
Continuous-time strategy selection in linear population
games. Experimental Economics 2:41–57.
[40] Traulsen A, Semmann D, Sommerfeld RD, Krambeck HJ,
Milinski M (2010) Human strategy updating in evolution-
ary games. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA 107:2962–2966.
[41] Gracia-La´zaro C et al. (2012) Heterogeneous networks do
not promote cooperation when humans play a prisoner’s
dilemma. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA 109:12922–12926.
[42] Chmura T, Goerg SJ, Selten R (2014) Generalized im-
pulse balance: An experimental test for a class of 3 × 3
games. Review of Behavioral Economics 1:27–53.
[43] Press WH, Dyson FJ (2012) Iterated prisoner’s dilemma
contains strategies that dominate any evolutionary op-
ponent. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA 109:10409–10413.
8Supplementary Table 1
Table S1. Statistics on individual players’ action marginal probabilities.
a m action µ σ Min Max
1.1 66 R 0.37 0.08 0.19 0.68
P 0.34 0.07 0.18 0.52
S 0.30 0.06 0.09 0.41
2 72 R 0.36 0.07 0.14 0.60
P 0.32 0.07 0.15 0.58
S 0.32 0.06 0.13 0.46
4 72 R 0.35 0.08 0.11 0.60
P 0.33 0.07 0.14 0.54
S 0.32 0.07 0.11 0.50
9 72 R 0.35 0.08 0.21 0.63
P 0.33 0.07 0.13 0.55
S 0.32 0.06 0.16 0.53
100 72 R 0.35 0.07 0.22 0.60
P 0.33 0.05 0.16 0.51
S 0.32 0.06 0.14 0.47
354 R 0.36 0.08 0.11 0.68
P 0.33 0.07 0.13 0.58
S 0.32 0.06 0.09 0.53
m is the total number of players; µ, σ, Max and Min are, respectively, the mean, the standard deviation (s.d.), the
maximum and minimum of the action marginal probability in question among all the m players. The last three rows
are statistics performed on all the 354 players.
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Table S2. Empirical cycling frequencies f1,150 and f151,300 for 59 populations.
1.1 2 4 9 100
f1,150 f151,300 f1,150 f151,300 f1,150 f151,300 f1,150 f151,300 f1,150 f151,300
0.032 0.047 0.020 0.017 0.016 0.050 −0.007 0.022 0.040 0.052
0.008 0.039 0.028 0.017 −0.002 0.014 −0.005 0.001 −0.003 0.009
0.025 −0.014 0.021 0.087 0.023 0.035 0.044 0.062 0.009 0.038
0.015 0.045 0.023 0.043 0.024 0.059 0.034 0.020 0.045 0.060
0.011 0.019 −0.027 0.006 0.019 −0.004 0.045 0.088 0.017 0.038
0.036 0.068 0.024 0.081 0.018 0.068 −0.022 −0.014 0.055 0.006
0.010 0.045 0.083 0.086 0.079 0.059 0.032 0.030 0.008 0.026
0.036 0.033 0.034 0.046 −0.013 −0.031 0.047 0.050 −0.019 −0.015
0.076 0.070 −0.032 0.004 0.077 0.061 0.010 0.027 −0.034 0.010
0.029 0.016 0.034 −0.002 0.018 0.051 −0.003 −0.041 0.055 0.052
0.009 0.025 −0.004 −0.006 0.061 0.038 0.005 0.029 −0.012 −0.007
0.022 0.031 0.017 0.019 0.011 0.055 −0.017 0.007
µ 0.026 0.036 0.019 0.034 0.028 0.035 0.016 0.027 0.012 0.023
σ 0.020 0.024 0.030 0.035 0.029 0.030 0.024 0.035 0.031 0.025
δ 0.006 0.007 0.009 0.010 0.008 0.009 0.007 0.010 0.009 0.007
The first row shows the value of the payoff parameter a. For each experimental session (population), f1,150 and
f151,300 are respectively the cycling frequency in the first and the second 150 time steps. µ is the mean cycling
frequency, σ is the standard deviation (s.d.) of the cycling frequency, δ = σ/
√
ns is the standard error (SEM) of the
mean cycling frequency. The number of populations is ns = 11 for a = 1.1 and ns = 12 for a = 2, 4, 9 and 100.
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Figure S1. Action shift probability conditional on a player’s current action. If a player adopts the action R at one
game round, this player’s conditional probability of repeating the same action at the next game round is denoted as
R0, while the conditional probability of performing a counter-clockwise or clockwise action shift is denoted,
respectively, as R+ and R−. The conditional probabilities P0, P+, P− and S0, S+, S− are defined similarly. The
mean value (vertical bin) and the SEM (standard error of the mean, error bar) of each conditional probability is
obtained by averaging over the different populations of the same value of a = 1.1, 2, 4, 9, and 100 (from top row to
bottom row).
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Figure S2. Probability distribution of payoff difference gcr − g0 at population size N = 12. As in Fig. 3, we assume
a > 2 and set the unit of the horizontal axis to be (a− 2). The solid line is obtained by sampling 2.4× 109 CR
strategies uniformly at random; the filled circle denotes the maximal value of gcr among these samples.
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Figure S3. The cycling frequency fcr of the conditional response model as a function of population size N . For the
purpose of illustration, the CR parameters shown in Fig. 2G are used in the numerical computations.
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Figure S4. Theoretical predictions of the conditional response model with population size N = 6. (A) Probability
distribution of the cycling frequency fcr obtained by sampling 2.4× 109 CR strategies uniformly at random. (B)
The mean value of fcr as a function of one fixed CR parameter while the remaining CR parameters are sampled
uniformly at random. The fixed CR parametr is T+ (red dashed line), W0 or L+ (brown dot-dashed line), W+ or T0
or L− (black solid line), W− or L0 (purple dot-dashed line), and T− (blue dashed line). (C) Cycling frequency fcr as
a function of CR parameters W0 and L0 for the symmetric CR model (W+/W− = T+/T− = L+/L− = 1) with
T0 = 0.333.
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Supporting Information
S1. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
We carried out five sets of experimental sessions at dif-
ferent days during the period of December 2010 to March
2014, with each set consisting of 12 individual experi-
mental sessions. The payoff parameter value was fixed to
a = 1.1, 2, 4, 9 and 100, respectively, in these five sets
of experimental sessions. Each experimental session in-
volvedN = 6 human subjects (players) and it was carried
out at Zhejiang University within a single day.
We recruited a total number of 72×5 = 360 undergrad-
uate and graduate students from different disciplines of
Zhejiang University. These students served as the players
of our experimental sessions, each of which participating
in only one experimental session. Female students were
more enthusiastic than male students in registering as
candidate human subjects of our experiments. As we
sampled students uniformly at random from the candi-
date list, therefore more female students were recruited
than male students (among the 360 students, the female
versus male ratio is 217 : 143). For each set of experi-
mental sessions, the recruited 72 players were distributed
into 12 groups (populations) of size N = 6 uniformly at
random by a computer program.
The players then sited separately in a classroom, each
of which facing a computer screen. They were not al-
lowed to communicate with each other during the whole
experimental session. Written instructions were handed
out to each player and the rules of the experiment were
also orally explained by an experimental instructor. The
rules of the experimental session are as follows:
(i) Each player plays the Rock-Paper-Scissors (RPS)
game repeatedly with the same other five players
for a total number of 300 rounds.
(ii) Each player earns virtual points during the ex-
perimental session according to the payoff matrix
shown in the written instruction. These virtual
points are then exchanged into RMB as a reward to
the player, plus an additional 5 RMB as show-up
fee. (The exchange rate between virtual point and
RMB is the same for all the 72 players of these 12
experimental sessions. Its actual value is informed
to the players.)
(iii) In each game round, the six players of each group
are randomly matched by a computer program to
form three pairs, and each player plays the RPS
game only with the assigned pair opponent.
(iv) Each player has at most 40 seconds in one game
round to make a choice among the three candidate
actions “Rock”, “Paper” and “Scissors”. If this
time runs out, the player has to make a choice im-
mediately (the experimental instructor will loudly
urge these players to do so). After a choice has
been made it can not be changed.
Before the start of the actual experimental session, the
player were asked to answer four questions to ensure that
they understand completely the rules of the experimen-
tal session. These four questions are: (1) If you choose
“Rock” and your opponent chooses “Scissors”, how many
virtual points will you earn? (2) If you choose “Rock” and
your opponent chooses also “Rock”, how many virtual
points will you earn? (3) If you choose “Scissors” and
your opponent chooses “Rock”, how many virtual points
will you earn? (4) Do you know that at each game round
you will play with a randomly chosen opponent from your
group (yes/no)?
During the experimental session, the computer screen
of each player will show an information window and a
decision window. The window on the left of the computer
screen is the information window. The upper panel of
this information window shows the current game round,
the time limit (40 seconds) of making a choice, and the
time left to make a choice. The color of this upper panel
turns to green at the start of each game round. The
color will change to yellow if the player does not make a
choice within 20 seconds. The color will change to red
if the decision time runs out (and then the experimental
instructor will loudly urge the players to make a choice
immediately). The color will change to blue if a choice
has been made by the player.
After all the players of the group have made their de-
cisions, the lower panel of the information window will
show the player’s own choice, the opponent’s choice, and
the player’s own payoff in this game round. The player’s
own accumulated payoff is also shown. The players are
asked to record their choices of each round on the record
sheet (Rock as R, Paper as P , and Scissors as S).
The window on the right of the computer screen is the
decision window. It is activated only after all the players
of the group have made their choices. The upper panel of
this decision window lists the current game round, while
the lower panel lists the three candidate actions “Rock”,
“Scissors”, “Paper” horizontally from left to right. The
player can make a choice by clicking on the correspond-
ing action names. After a choice has been made by the
player, the decision window becomes inactive until the
next game round starts.
The reward in RMB for each player is determined by
the following formula. Suppose a player i earns xi virtual
points in the whole experimental session, the total reward
yi in RMB for this player is then given by yi = xi × r +
5, where r is the exchange rate between virtual point
and RMB. In this work we set r = 0.45/(1 + a). Then
the expected total earning in RMB for a player will be
the same (= 50 RMB) in the five sets of experimental
sessions under the assumption of mixed-strategy Nash
equilibrium, which predicts the expected payoff of each
player in one game round to be (1 + a)/3. The actual
numerical value of r and the above-mentioned reward
formula were listed in the written instruction and also
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orally mentioned by the experimental instructor at the
instruction phase of the experiment.
S2. THE MIXED-STRATEGY NASH
EQUILIBRIUM
The RPS game has a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium
(NE), in which every player of the population adopts the
three actions (R, P , and S) with the same probability
1/3 in each round of the game. Here we give a proof of
this statement. We also demonstrate that, the empiri-
cally observed action marginal probabilities of individual
players are consistent with the NE mixed strategy.
Consider a population of N individuals playing re-
peatedly the RPS game under the random pairwise-
matching protocol. Let us define ρRi (respectively, ρ
P
i
and ρSi ) as the probability that a player i of the popu-
lation (i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N}) will choose action R (respec-
tively, P and S) in one game round. If a player j
chooses action R, what is her expected payoff in one
play? Since this player has equal chance 1/(N − 1) of
pairing with any another player i, the expected pay-
off is simply gRj ≡
∑
i6=j(ρ
R
i + aρ
S
i )/(N − 1). By the
same argument we see that if player j chooses action
P and S the expected payoff gPj and g
S
j in one play
are, respectively, gPj ≡
∑
i6=j(ρ
P
i + aρ
R
i )/(N − 1) and
gSj ≡
∑
i6=j(ρ
S
i + aρ
P
i )/(N − 1).
If every player of the population chooses the three ac-
tions with equal probability, namely that ρRi = ρ
P
i =
ρSi = 1/3 for i = 1, 2, . . . , N , then the expected payoff for
a player is the same no matter which action she chooses
in one round of the game, i.e., gRi = g
P
i = g
S
i = (1+a)/3
for i = 1, 2, . . . , N . Then the expected payoff of a player
i in one game round is (1 + a)/3, which will not increase
if the probabilities ρRi , ρ
P
i , ρ
S
i deviate from 1/3. There-
fore ρRi = ρ
P
i = ρ
S
i = 1/3 (for all i = 1, 2, . . . , N) is a
mixed-strategy NE of the game.
Let us also discuss a little bit about the uniqueness of
this mixed-strategy NE. If the payoff parameter a ≤ 1,
this mixed-strategy NE is not unique. We can easily
check that ρRi = 1, ρ
P
i = ρ
S
i = 0 (for all i = 1, 2, . . . , N) is
a pure-strategy NE. Similarly, ρPi = 1, ρ
S
i = ρ
R
i = 0 (i =
1, 2, . . . , N) and ρSi = 1, ρ
R
i = ρ
P
i = 0 (i = 1, 2, . . . , N)
are two other pure-strategy NEs. In such a pure-strategy
NE the payoff of a player is 1 in one game round. This
value is considerably higher than the average payoff of
(1 + a)/3 a player will gain if the population is in the
above mentioned mixed-strategy NE.
On the other hand, if the payoff parameter a > 1, then
there is no pure-strategy NE for the RPS game. This is
simple to prove. Suppose the population is initially in a
pure-strategy NE with ρRi = 1 for i = 1, 2, . . . , N . If one
player now shifts to action S, her payoff will increase from
1 to a. Therefore this player will keep the new action S in
later rounds of the game, and the original pure-strategy
NE is then destroyed.
We believe that the mixed-strategy NE of ρRi = ρ
P
i =
ρSi = 1/3 (for i = 1, 2, . . . , N) is the only Nash equilib-
rium of our RPS game in the whole parameter region of
a > 1 (except for very few isolated values of a, maybe).
Unfortunately we are unable to offer a rigorous proof of
this conjecture for a generic value of population size N .
But this conjecture is supported by our empirical obser-
vations, see Table S1.
Among the 60 experimental sessions performed at dif-
ferent values of a, we observed that all the players in
59 experimental sessions change their actions frequently.
The mean values of the individual action probabilities
ρRi , ρ
P
i , ρ
S
i are all close to 1/3. (The slightly higher
mean probability of choosing action R in the empirical
data of Table S1 might be linked to the fact that “Rock”
is the left-most candidate choice in each player’s decision
window.)
We did notice considerable deviation from the NE
mixed strategy in one experimental session of a = 1.1,
though. After the RPS game has proceeded for 72
rounds, the six players of this exceptional session all stick
to the same action R and do not shift to the other two
actions. This population obviously has reached a highly
cooperative state after 72 game rounds with ρRi = 1 for
all the six players. As we have pointed out, such a cooper-
ative state is not a pure-strategy NE. We do not consider
this exceptional experimental session in the data analysis
and model building phase of this work.
S3. EVOLUTIONARY STABILITY OF THE
NASH EQUILIBRIUM
We now demonstrate that the mixed-strategy NE with
ρRi = ρ
P
i = ρ
S
i = 1/3 (i = 1, 2, . . . , N) is an evolutionarily
stable strategy only when the payoff parameter a > 2.
To check for the evolutionary stability of this mixed-
strategy NE, let us assume a mutation occurs to the pop-
ulation such that n ≥ 1 players now adopt a mutated
strategy, while the remaining (N − n) players still adopt
the NE mixed strategy. We denote by ρ˜R (and respec-
tively, ρ˜P and ρ˜S) as the probability that in one round of
the game, action R (respectively, P and S) will be chosen
by a player who adopts the mutated strategy. Obviously
ρ˜R + ρ˜P + ρ˜S ≡ 1.
For a player who adopts the NE mixed strategy, her
expected payoff in one game round is simply g0 = (1 +
a)/3. On the other hand, the expected payoff g˜ in one
game round for a player who adopts the mutated strategy
is expressed as g˜ = ρ˜Rg˜R + ρ˜P g˜P + ρ˜S g˜S , where g˜R (and
respectively, g˜P and g˜S) is the expected payoff of one
play for a player in the mutated sub-population if she
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chooses action R (respectively, P and S):
g˜R =
N − n
N − 1 ×
1 + a
3
+
n− 1
N − 1 ×
(
ρ˜R + aρ˜S
)
, (8)
g˜P =
N − n
N − 1 ×
1 + a
3
+
n− 1
N − 1 ×
(
ρ˜P + aρ˜R
)
, (9)
g˜S =
N − n
N − 1 ×
1 + a
3
+
n− 1
N − 1 ×
(
ρ˜S + aρ˜P
)
. (10)
Inserting these three expressions into the expression of g˜,
we obtain that
g˜ =
N − n
N − 1 ×
1 + a
3
+
n− 1
N − 1 ×(
1 + (a− 2)[ρ˜Rρ˜P + (ρ˜R + ρ˜P )(1− ρ˜R − ρ˜P )]
)
= g0 − (a− 2)(n− 1)
N − 1 ×([
(ρ˜R − 1/3) + (ρ˜P /2− 1/6)]2 + 3[ρ˜P − 1/3]2/4
)
.
(11)
If the payoff parameter a > 2, we see from Eq. [11]
that the expected payoff g˜ of the mutated strategy never
exceeds that of the NE mixed strategy. Therefore the
NE mixed strategy is an evolutionarily stable strategy.
Notice that the difference (g˜− g0) is proportional to (a−
2), therefore the larger the value of a, the higher is the
cost of deviating from the NE mixed strategy.
On the other hand, in the case of a < 2, the value of
g˜ − g0 will be positive if two or more players adopt the
mutated strategy. Therefore the NE mixed strategy is an
evolutionarily unstable strategy.
The mixed-strategy NE for the game with payoff pa-
rameter a = 2 is referred to as evolutionarily neutral
since it is neither evolutionarily stable nor evolutionarily
unstable.
S4. CYCLING FREQUENCIES PREDICTED BY
TWO SIMPLE MODELS
We now demonstrate that the empirically observed
persistent cycling behaviors could not have been observed
if the population were in the mixed-strategy NE, and
they cannot be explained by the independent decision
model either.
A. Assuming the mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium
If the population is in the mixed-strategy NE, each
player will pick an action uniformly at random at each
time t. Suppose the social state at time t is s =
(nR, nP , nS), then the probability M0[s
′|s] of the social
state being s′ = (n′R, n
′
P , n
′
S) at time (t + 1) is simply
expressed as
M0[s
′|s] = N !
(n′R)!(n
′
P )!(n
′
S)!
(1
3
)N
, (12)
which is independent of s. Because of this history inde-
pendence, the social state probability distribution P ∗0 (s)
for any s = (nR, nP , nS) is
P ∗0 (s) =
N !
nR!nP !nS !
(1
3
)N
. (13)
The social state transition obeys the detailed balance
condition that P ∗0 (s)M0[s
′|s] = P ∗0 (s′)M0[s|s′]. There-
fore no persist cycling can exist in the mixed-strategy
NE. Starting from any initial social state s, the mean
of the social states at the next time step is d(s) =∑
s
′ M0[s
′|s]s′ = c0, i.e., identical to the centroid of the
social state plane.
B. Assuming the independent decision model
In the independent decision model, every player of the
population decides on her next action q′ ∈ {R,P, S}
in a probabilistic manner based on her current action
q ∈ {R,P, S} only. For example, if the current action of
a player i is R, then in the next game round this player
has probability R0 to repeat action R, probability R− to
shift action clockwise to S, and probability R+ to shift
action counter-clockwise to P . The transition probabil-
ities P−, P0, P+ and S−, S0, S+ are defined in the same
way. These nine transition probabilities of cause have to
satisfy the normalization conditions: R−+R0+R+ = 1,
P− + P0 + P+ = 1, and S− + S0 + S+ = 1.
Given the social state s = (nR, nP , nS) at time t, the probability Mid[s
′|s] of the population’s social state being
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s′ = (n′R, n
′
P , n
′
S) at time (t+ 1) is
Mid[s
′|s] =
∑
nR→R
∑
nR→P
∑
nR→S
nR!
nR→R!nR→P !nR→S !
RnR→S− R
nR→R
0 R
nR→P
+ δ
nR
nR→R+nR→P+nR→S
×
∑
nP→R
∑
nP→P
∑
nP→S
nP !
nP→R!nP→P !nP→S !
PnP→R− P
nP→P
0 P
nP→S
+ δ
nP
nP→R+nP→P+nP→S
×
∑
nS→R
∑
nS→P
∑
nS→S
nS !
nS→R!nS→P !nS→S !
SnS→P− S
nS→S
0 S
nS→R
+ δ
nS
nS→R+nS→P+nS→S
×δn
′
R
nR→R+nP→R+nS→Rδ
n′P
nR→P+nP→P+nS→P δ
n′S
nR→S+nP→S+nS→S , (14)
where nq→q′ denotes the total number of action transitions from q to q
′, and δnm is the Kronecker symbol such that
δnm = 1 if m = n and δ
n
m = 0 if m 6= n.
For this independent decision model, the steady-state
distribution P ∗id(s) of the social states is determined by
solving
P ∗id(s) =
∑
s
′
Mid[s|s′]P ∗id(s′) . (15)
When the population has reached this steady-state distri-
bution, the mean cycling frequency fid is then computed
as
fid =
∑
s
P ∗id(s)
∑
s
′
Mid[s
′|s]θs→s′ , (16)
where θs→s′ is the rotation angle associated with the
transition s→ s′, see Eq. [7].
Using the empirically determined action transition
probabilities of Fig. S1 as inputs, the independent de-
cision model predicts the cycling frequency to be 0.0050
(for a = 1.1), −0.0005 (a = 2), −0.0024 (a = 4), −0.0075
(a = 9) and −0.0081 (a = 100), which are all very close to
zero and significantly different from the empirical values.
Therefore the assumption of players making decisions
independently of each other cannot explain population-
level cyclic motions.
S5. DETAILS OF THE CONDITIONAL
RESPONSE MODEL
A. Social state transition matrix
In the most general case, our win-lose-tie conditional
response (CR) model has nine transition parameters,
namely W−, W0, W+, T−, T0, T+, L−, L0, L+. These
parameters are all non-negative and are constrained by
three normalization conditions:
W−+W0+W+ = 1 , T−+T0+T+ = 1 , L−+L0+L+ = 1 ,
(17)
therefore the three vectors (W−,W0,W+), (T−, T0, T+)
and (L−, L0, L+) represent three points of the three-
dimensional simplex. Because of Eq. [17], we can use
a set Γ ≡ {W−,W+;T−, T+;L−, L+} of six transition
probabilities to denote a conditional response strategy.
The parametersW+ andW− are, respectively, the con-
ditional probability that a player (say i) will perform a
counter-clockwise or clockwise action shift in the next
game round, given that she wins over the opponent (say
j) in the current game round. Similarly the parame-
ters T+ and T− are the two action shift probabilities
conditional on the current play being a tie, while L+
and L− are the action shift probabilities conditional on
the current play outcome being ‘lose’. The parameters
W0, T0, L0 are the probabilities of a player repeating the
same action in the next play given the current play out-
come being ‘win’, ‘tie’ and ‘lose’, respectively. For exam-
ple, if the current action of i is R and that of j is S, the
joint probability of i choosing action P and j choosing
action S in the next play is W+L0; while if both play-
ers choose R in the current play, the joint probability of
player i choosing P and player j choosing S in the next
play is then T+T−.
We denote by s ≡ (nR, nP , nS) a social state of the
population, where nR, nP , and nS are the number of
players who adopt action R, P and S in one round
of play, respectively. Since nR + nP + nS ≡ N there
are (N + 1)(N + 2)/2 such social states, all lying on a
three-dimensional plane bounded by an equilateral trian-
gle (Fig. 1C).
Furthermore we denote by nrr, npp, nss, nrp, nps and
nsr, respectively, the number of pairs in which the com-
petition being R–R, P–P , S–S, R–P , P–S, and S–R,
in this round of play. These nine integer values are not
independent but are related by the following equations:
nR = 2nrr + nsr + nrp ,
nP = 2npp + nrp + nps ,
nS = 2nss + nps + nsr .
(18)
Knowing the values of nR, nP , nS is not suffi-
cient to uniquely fix the values of nrr, npp, . . . , nsr.
the conditional joint probability distribution of
nrr, npp, nss, nrp, nps, nsr is expressed as Eq. [3].
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To understand this expression, let us first notice that the
total number of pairing patterns of N players is equal to
N !
(N/2)! 2N/2
= (N − 1)!! ,
which is independent of the specific values of nR, nP , nS ;
and second, the number of pairing patterns with nrr R–
R pairs, npp P–P pairs, . . ., and nsr S–R pairs is equal
to
nR! nP ! nS !
2nrrnrr! 2nppnpp! 2nssnss! nrp! nps! nsr!
.
Given the values of nrr, npp, . . . , nsr which describe the
current pairing pattern, the conditional probability of the
social state in the next round of play can be determined.
We just need to carefully analyze the conditional prob-
ability for each player of the population. For example,
consider a R–P pair at game round t. This is a lose–win
pair, therefore the two involved players will determine
their actions of the next game round according to the
CR parameters (L−, L0, L+) and (W−,W0,W+), respec-
tively. At time (t+1) there are six possible outcomes: (rr)
both players take action R, with probability L0W−; (pp)
both players take action P , with probability L+W0; (ss)
both players take action S, with probability L−W+; (rp)
one player takes action R while the other takes action P ,
with probability (L0W0 + L+W−); (ps) one player takes
action P while the other takes action S, with probability
(L+W++L−W0); (sr) one player takes action S and the
other takes action R, with probability (L−W−+L0W+).
Among the nrp R–P pairs of time t, let us assume that
after the play, nrrrp of these pairs will outcome (rr), n
pp
rp of
them will outcome (pp), nssrp of them will outcome (ss),
nrprp of them will outcome (rp), n
ps
ps of them will outcome
(ps), and nsrsr of them will outcome (sr). Similarly we
can define a set of non-negative integers to describe the
outcome pattern for each of the other five types of pairs.
Under the random pairwise-matching game protocol, our conditional response model gives the following expression
for the transition probability Mcr[s
′|s] from the social state s ≡ (nR, nP , nS) at time t to the social state s′ ≡
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(n′R, n
′
P , n
′
S) at time (t+ 1):
Mcr[s
′|s] =
∑
nrr ,npp,...,nsr
nR! nP ! nS ! δ
nR
2nrr+nsr+nrp
δnP2npp+nrp+nps δ
nS
2nss+nps+nsr
(N − 1)!! 2nrrnrr! 2nppnpp! 2nssnss! nrp! nps! nsr!
×
∑
nrrrr,...,n
sr
rr
nrr! T
2nrrrr
0 T
2npprr
+ T
2nssrr
− (2T+T0)
nrprr (2T+T−)
npsrr (2T0T−)
nsrrr
nrrrr! n
pp
rr ! nssrr! n
rp
rr ! n
ps
rr! nsrrr!
δnrrnrrrr+...+nsrrr
×
∑
nrrpp,...,n
sr
pp
npp! T
2nrrpp
− T
2npppp
0 T
2nsspp
+ (2T0T−)
nrppp (2T+T0)
npspp (2T+T−)
nsrpp
nrrpp! n
pp
pp! nsspp! n
rp
pp! n
ps
pp! nsrpp!
δ
npp
nrrpp+...+n
sr
pp
×
∑
nrrss ,...,n
sr
ss
nss! T
2nrrss
+ T
2nppss
− T
2nssss
0 (2T+T−)
nrpss (2T0T−)
npsss (2T+T0)
nsrss
nrrss! n
pp
ss ! nssss! n
rp
ss ! n
ps
ss ! nsrss!
δnssnrrss+...+nsrss
×
∑
nrrrp,...,n
sr
rp
nrp! δ
nrp
nrrrp+...+n
sr
rp
nrrrp! n
pp
rp! nssrp! n
rp
rp! n
ps
rp! nsrrp!
(W−L0)
nrrrp (W0L+)
npprp (W+L−)
nssrp
× (W0L0 +W−L+)n
rp
rp (W+L+ +W0L−)
npsrp (W+L0 +W−L−)
nsrrp
×
∑
nrrps,...,n
sr
ps
nps! δ
nps
nrrps+...+n
sr
ps
nrrps! n
pp
ps ! nssps! n
rp
ps! n
ps
ps! nsrps!
(W+L−)
nrrps (W−L0)
nppps (W0L+)
nssps
× (W+L0 +W−L−)n
rp
ps (W0L0 +W−L+)
npsps (W+L+ +W0L−)
nsrps
×
∑
nrrsr ,...,n
sr
sr
nsr! δ
nps
nrrsr+...+n
sr
sr
nrrsr ! n
pp
sr ! nsssr! n
rp
sr ! n
ps
sr ! nsrsr!
(W0L+)
nrrsr (W+L−)
nppsr (W−L0)
nsssr
× (W+L+ +W0L−)n
rp
sr (W+L0 +W−L−)
npssr (W0L0 +W−L+)
nsrsr
× δn′R
2(nrrrr+n
rr
pp+n
rr
ss+n
rr
rp+n
rr
ps+n
rr
sr)+(n
sr
rr+n
sr
pp+n
sr
ss+n
sr
rp+n
sr
ps+n
sr
sr)+(n
rp
rr+n
rp
pp+n
rp
ss+n
rp
rp+n
rp
ps+n
rp
sr )
× δn′P
2(npprr+n
pp
pp+n
pp
ss+n
pp
rp+n
pp
ps+n
pp
sr )+(n
rp
rr+n
rp
pp+n
rp
ss+n
rp
rp+n
rp
ps+n
rp
sr )+(n
ps
rr+n
ps
pp+n
ps
ss+n
ps
rp+n
ps
ps+n
ps
sr)
× δn′S
2(nssrr+n
ss
pp+n
ss
ss+n
ss
rp+n
ss
ps+n
ss
sr)+(n
ps
rr+n
ps
pp+n
ps
ss+n
ps
rp+n
ps
ps+n
ps
sr)+(nsrrr+n
sr
pp+n
sr
ss+n
sr
rp+n
sr
ps+n
sr
sr)
.
(19)
Steady-state properties
It is not easy to further simplify the transition probabilitiesMcr[s
′|s], but their values can be determined numerically.
Then the steady-state distribution P ∗cr(s) of the social states is determined by numerically solving the following
equation:
P ∗cr(s) =
∑
s
′
Mcr[s|s′]P ∗cr(s′) . (20)
Except for extremely rare cases of the conditional response parameters (e.g., W0 = T0 = L0 = 1), the Markov
transition matrix defined by Eq. [19] is ergodic, meaning that it is possible to reach from any social state s1 to any
another social state s2 within a finite number of time steps. This ergodic property guarantees that Eq. [20] has a
unique steady-state solution P ∗(s). In the steady-state, the mean cycling frequency fcr of this conditional response
model is then computed through Eq. [4] of the main text. And the mean payoff gcr of each player in one game round
is obtained by
gcr =
1
N
∑
s
P ∗cr(s)
∑
nrr ,npp,...,nrs
Probs(nrr, npp, . . . , nsr)
[
2(nrr + npp + nss) + a(nrp + nps + nsr)
]
= 1 +
(a− 2)
N
∑
s
P ∗cr(s)
∑
nrr ,npp,...,nrs
Probs(nrr, npp, . . . , nsr)[nrp + nps + nsr] . (21)
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The expression [21] is identical to Eq. [5] of the main text.
Using the five sets of CR parameters of Fig. 2, we
obtain the values of gcr for the five data sets to be
gcr = g0 + 0.005 (for a = 1.1), gcr = g0 (a = 2),
gcr = g0 + 0.001 (a = 4), gcr = g0 + 0.004 (a = 9),
and gcr = g0+0.08 (a = 100). When a 6= 2 the predicted
values of gcr are all slightly higher than g0 = (1 + a)/3,
which is the expected payoff per game round for a player
adopting the NE mixed strategy. On the empirical side,
we compute the mean payoff gi per game round for each
player i in all populations of the same value of a. The
mean value of gi among these players, denoted as g, is
also found to be slightly higher than g0 for all the four
sets of populations of a 6= 2. To be more specific, we ob-
serve that g−g0 equals to 0.009±0.004 (for a = 1.1, mean
± SEM), 0.000 ± 0.006 (a = 2), 0.004 ± 0.012 (a = 4),
0.01 ± 0.02 (a = 9) and 0.05 ± 0.37 (a = 100). These
theoretical and empirical results indicate that the con-
ditional response strategy has the potential of bringing
higher payoffs to individual players as compared with the
NE mixed strategy.
B. The symmetric case
Very surprisingly, we find that asymmetry in the CR
parameters is not essential for cycle persistence and direc-
tion. We find that if the CR parameters are symmetric
with respect to clockwise and counter-clockwise action
shifts (namely, W+/W− = T+/T− = L+/L− = 1), the
cycling frequency fcr is still nonzero as long as W0 6= L0.
The magnitude of fcr increases with |W0 − L0| and de-
creases with T0, and the cycling is counter-clockwise
(fcr > 0) if W0 > L0 and clockwise (fcr < 0) if L0 > W0,
see Fig. S4 C. In other words, in this symmetric CR
model, if losers are more (less) likely to shift actions than
winners, the social state cycling will be counter-clockwise
(clockwise).
To give some concrete examples, we symmetrize the
transition parameters of Fig. 2 (F–J) while keeping the
empirical values of W0, T0, L0 unchanged. The resulting
cycling frequencies are, respectively, fcr = 0.024 (a =
1.1), 0.017 (a = 2.0), 0.017 (a = 4.0), 0.015 (a = 9.0) and
0.017 (a = 100.0), which are all significantly beyond zero.
Our model is indeed dramatically different from the best
response model, for which asymmetry in decision-making
is a basic assumption.
C. Sampling the conditional response parameters
For the population size N = 6, we uniformly sam-
ple 2.4 × 109 sets of conditional response parameters
W−,W0, . . . , L0, L+ under the constraints of Eq. [17], and
for each of them we determine the theoretical frequency
fcr and the theoretical payoff gcr numerically. By this
way we obtain the joint probability distribution of fcr
and gcr and also the marginal probability distributons of
fcr and gcr, see Fig. 3, Fig. S2 and Fig. S4 A. The mean
values of |fcr| and gcr are then computed from this joint
probability distribution. We find that the mean value of
fcr is equal to zero, while the mean value of |fcr| ≈ 0.061.
The mean value of gcr for randomly sampled CR strate-
gies is determined to be g0 − 0.0085(a − 2) for N = 6.
When a > 2 this mean value is less than g0, indicating
that if the CR parameters are randomly chosen, the CR
strategy has high probability of being inferior to the NE
mixed strategy.
However, we also notice that gcr can considerably ex-
ceed g0 for some optimized sets of conditional response
parameters (see Fig. 3 for the case of N = 6 and Fig. S2
for the case of N = 12). To give some concrete exam-
ples, here we list for population size N = 6 the five sets
of CR parameters of the highest values of gcr among the
sampled 2.4× 109 sets of parameters:
1. {W− = 0.002,W0 = 0.998,W+ = 0.000, T− =
0.067, T0 = 0.823, T+ = 0.110, L− = 0.003, L0 =
0.994, L+ = 0.003}. For this set, the cycling fre-
quency is fcr = 0.003, and the expected payoff of
one game round is gcr = g0 + 0.035(a− 2).
2. {W− = 0.001,W0 = 0.993,W+ = 0.006, T− =
0.154, T0 = 0.798, T+ = 0.048, L− = 0.003, L0 =
0.994, L+ = 0.003}. For this set, fcr = 0.007 and
gcr = g0 + 0.034(a− 2).
3. {W− = 0.995,W0 = 0.004,W+ = 0.001, T− =
0.800, T0 = 0.142, T+ = 0.058, L− = 0.988, L0 =
0.000, L+ = 0.012}. For this set, fcr = −0.190 and
gcr = g0 + 0.034(a− 2).
4. {W− = 0.001,W0 = 0.994,W+ = 0.004, T− =
0.063, T0 = 0.146, T+ = 0.791, L− = 0.989, L0 =
0.010, L+ = 0.001}. For this set, fcr = 0.189 and
gcr = g0 + 0.033(a− 2).
5. {W− = 0.001,W0 = 0.992,W+ = 0.006, T− =
0.167, T0 = 0.080, T+ = 0.753, L− = 0.998, L0 =
0.000, L+ = 0.002}. For this set, fcr = 0.179 and
gcr = g0 + 0.033(a− 2).
To determine the influence of each of the nine condi-
tional response parameters to the cycling frequency fcr,
we fix each of these nine conditional response parameters
and sample all the others uniformly at random under the
constraints of Eq. [17]. The mean value 〈fcr〉 of fcr as
a function of this fixed conditional response parameter
is then obtained by repeating this process many times,
see Fig. S4 B. As expected, we find that when the fixed
conditional response parameter is equal to 1/3, the mean
cycling frequency 〈fcr〉 = 0. Furthermore we find that
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1. If W0, T+ or L+ is the fixed parameter, then 〈fcr〉
increases (almost linearly) with fixed parameter, in-
dicating that a larger value of W0, T+ or L+ pro-
motes counter-clockwise cycling at the population
level.
2. If W−, T− or L0 is the fixed parameter, then 〈fcr〉
decreases (almost linearly) with this fixed parame-
ter, indicating that a larger value of W−, T− or L0
promotes clockwise cycling at the population level.
3. If W+, T0 or L− is the fixed parameter, then 〈fcr〉
does not change with this fixed parameter (i.e.,
〈fcr〉 = 0), indicating that these three conditional
response parameters are neutral as the cycling di-
rection is concerned.
D. Action marginal distribution of a single player
The social state transition matrix Eq. [19] has the fol-
lowing rotation symmetry:
Mcr[(n
′
R, n
′
P , n
′
S)|(nR, nP , nS)]
=Mcr[(n
′
S , n
′
R, n
′
P )|(nS , nR, nP )]
=Mcr[(n
′
P , n
′
S , n
′
R)|(nP , nS , nR)] . (22)
Because of this rotation symmetry, the steady-state dis-
tribution P ∗cr(s) has also the rotation symmetry that
P ∗cr(nR, nP , nS) = P
∗
cr(nS , nR, nP ) = P
∗
cr(nP , nS , nR) .
(23)
After the social states of the population has reached
the steady-state distribution P ∗cr(s), the probability ρ
R
cr
that a randomly chosen player adopts action R in one
game round is expressed as
ρRcr =
∑
s
P ∗cr(s)
nR
nR + nP + nS
=
1
N
∑
s
P ∗cr(s)nR ,
(24)
where the summation is over all the possible social states
s = (nR, nP , nS). The probabilities ρ
P
cr and ρ
S
cr that a
randomly chosen player adopts action P and S in one
play can be computed similarly. Because of the rotation
symmetry Eq. [23] of P ∗cr(s), we obtain that ρ
R
cr = ρ
P
cr =
ρScr = 1/3.
Therefore, if the players of the population all play the
same CR strategy, then after the population reaches the
the steady-state, the action marginal distribution of each
player will be identical to the NE mixed strategy. In
other words, the CR strategy can not be distinguished
from the NE mixed strategy through measure the action
marginal distributions of individual players.
E. Computer simulations
All of the theoretical predictions of the CR model have
been confirmed by extensive computer simulations. In
each of our computer simulation processes, a popula-
tion of N players repeatedly play the RPS game under
the random pairwise-matching protocol. At each game
round, each player of this population makes a choice on
her action following exactly the CR strategy. The pa-
rameters {W−,W0, . . . , L+} of this strategy is specified
at the start of the simulation and they do not change
during the simulation process.
S6. THE GENERALIZED CONDITIONAL
RESPONSE MODEL
If the payoff matrix of the RPS model is more complex
than the one shown in Fig. 1A, the conditional response
model may still be applicable after some appropriate ex-
tensions. In the most general case, we can assume that a
player’s decision is influenced by the player’s own action
and the opponent’s action in the previous game round.
Let us denote by qs ∈ {R,P, S} a player’s action at
time t, and by qo ∈ {R,P, S} the action of this player’s
opponent at time t. Then at time (t+1), the probability
that this player adopts action q ∈ {R,P, S} is denoted
as Qq(qs,qo), with the normalization condition that
QR(qs,qo) +Q
P
(qs,qo)
+QS(qs,qo) ≡ 1 . (25)
This generalized conditional response model has 27
transition parameters, which are constrained by 9 nor-
malization conditions (see Eq. [25]). The social state
transition matrix of this generalized model is slightly
more complicated than Eq. [19].
The win-lose-tie conditional response model is a lim-
iting case of this more general model. It can be de-
rived from this general model by assuming Qq(R,R) =
Qq(P,P ) = Q
q
(S,S), Q
q
(R,P ) = Q
q
(P,S) = Q
q
(S,R), and
Qq(R,S) = Q
q
(P,R) = Q
q
(S,P ). These additional assump-
tions are reasonable only for the simplest payoff matrix
shown in Fig. 1A.
